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Executive Summary
Employers and company managers have an important role to play in creating work environments
free from AIDS-related stigma and discrimination. Implementing HIV/AIDS policies in the
workplace can curb such unfair employment practices as compulsory HIV testing and can help
meet the needs of people living with HIV/AIDS for confidentiality and assistance.
A recently completed Horizons study in Thailand examined the question of how to encourage the
private sector to become actively involved in developing and improving workplace HIV/AIDS
programs. Researchers investigated the role of incentives in encouraging companies to adopt
workplace policies and programs that address stigma and discrimination and respond to the needs
of workers for information and services. The research was conducted in partnership with American
International Assurance (AIA), the Thailand Business Coalition on AIDS (TBCA), and AusAID,
the overseas development agency of the Australian government.
The investigators explored the process and outcomes of offering incentives to encourage
companies to improve their workplace HIV/AIDS policies and programs. They hypothesized that
these incentives would motivate companies to introduce or improve their policies and activities,
which in turn would result in improvements in employees’ knowledge and behaviors.

Intervention
The initiative, known as the AIDS-response Standard Organization (ASO), was launched at a press
conference that publicized the availability of incentives to encourage companies to implement
HIV/AIDS workplace programs and policies. TBCA staff built relationships with company
managers, in order to explain and promote the advantages of joining the initiative.
Companies agreeing to implement at least the minimum three required anti-discriminatory
HIV/AIDS workplace policies received a reduction of 5 to 10 percent off their group life insurance
premiums from AIA, Thailand’s largest insurance provider, if they were AIA clients. As the
initiative evolved, TBCA introduced the additional incentive of a certificate jointly endorsed by the
Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, which was awarded at a
high-profile public ceremony.
For each company agreeing to participate, TBCA offered assistance to enhance their activities,
including providing educational leaflets, videos, and a mobile exhibition, as well as condoms, peer
education training, counseling and referrals to support groups for HIV-positive employees, and
assistance with writing company HIV/AIDS policies.
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Study Design and Data Collection Methods
The study was conducted among companies in Bangkok, Chiang Mai, and neighboring provinces
between May 2000 and April 2002. The researchers used a checklist to document the
characteristics of the 857 companies that were invited to join the initiative, and conducted
interviews with managers of 99 of the 125 companies that agreed to participate in ASO and 144
that declined to participate. Managers and approximately 9,000 employees from the 125
participating companies twice completed self-administered questionnaires, first when they joined
the initiative and then again 18 months later. Data from the managers’ questionnaires were used to
determine a pre- and post-intervention accreditation score for each company.

Key Findings
Managers were more motivated by a sense of social responsibility to improve their policies
and programs than by the incentives offered for participation in the initiative.
The most important reason cited by company managers for joining ASO and subsequently
implementing HIV/AIDS policies in the workplace was an altruistic one: the opportunity to act in
the best interests of their employees. Nearly 60 percent of the 125 company managers choosing to
join ASO decided to participate because they felt a sense of responsibility to their workers and the
wider community to do something about HIV/AIDS.
“The incentive...to be involved in the fight against AIDS is not simply about money or
certificates, but about us giving our workers greater knowledge and providing them with
additional training.”
Manager, ASO participating company
Managers reported that other motivations to join the initiative were that ASO would allow them to
find out how their HIV/AIDS policies and programs compare to those of other companies, and to
better understand the disease and how employees may be at risk due to their behavior.
Only 11 percent of managers who participated said that they had joined ASO for its financial
benefits, while the rest—particularly smaller companies with fewer resources—did not perceive the
premium reduction as being enough to justify the additional costs of introducing the policies and
activities. With life insurance coverage costing employers an average premium of 250 baht (US
$5.85) per employee, the maximum reduction available was 25 baht (US $0.60) per employee.
“To be honest, it is only a small amount. Seeing that we would have to invest time, it would be
time consuming and complicated.”
Manager, nonparticipating company
Neither did company managers value the certificate nor attach much importance to receiving it at a
public ceremony. They indicated that the certificate would have had greater value if it had been
endorsed by a well-known international organization or the Thai royal family; or if the initiative
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itself had been better known in the first place, thereby making achievement of the certificate a
significant accomplishment.
“Our hotel has so many [certificates] that I do not know where to put them. I am not interested
in the certificate unless it came from someone really important.”
Manager, ASO participating company
Researchers also discovered that some managers declined to join because the sign-up process
appeared very complicated or because they suspected the incentive scheme was an AIA marketing
ploy, since only AIA clients were entitled to the insurance discount.

Managers with closer or preexisting connections to the initiative, such as physical location,
staff contacts, or company commitment to HIV, were more likely to participate.
Overall participation in the initiative was 1 percent of the 857 companies originally invited.
Participating companies included factories, hotels, and commercial and professional firms, as well
as companies of diverse size and ownership characteristics. Company characteristics associated
with higher levels of participation in the initiative included a history of previous involvement in
HIV/AIDS activities and the manager’s personal commitment to the issue. The most successful
method of recruiting companies was approaching companies and individuals already known to
TBCA. Locally owned and headquartered companies had significantly higher participation levels
than those in which the locus of decision-making was physically more distant. Larger companies,
to whom the fixed costs of the required policy changes represent a proportionately smaller burden,
might have been more likely to sign up for the initiative.

Most participating companies improved their HIV/AIDS policies and programs.
ASO had a marked impact on the workplaces of participating companies, with 82 percent of
participants improving their accreditation score between the two rounds. Overall, the mean total
accreditation score increased from 37 to 51 points out of a maximum of 100 (p < .001).

Broad policy improvements were not associated with specific changes at the employee level.
The self-administered questionnaires completed by employees indicated very limited changes in
the knowledge and behavior of individuals. This is not surprising, since an intervention designed
for impact on individual risk behaviors must go beyond the policy level to directly and consistently
reach employees over a significant time period.
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Among participating companies, financial incentives were associated with greater policy
improvements.
Although the financial incentive was perceived to be insufficient to motivate many companies to
join ASO, it likely played a positive role once companies had already signed up. About a third of
125 companies that joined ASO held AIA group life insurance policies and were eligible for
premium reductions. These AIA member companies showed greater improvements in their policies
and spent more to improve their programs than did the non-AIA member companies that joined
ASO and were thus ineligible for financial benefits. Financial rewards can clearly have an impact
on company polices and programs, but their influence in this study was limited to policy
implementation and not company recruitment.

Conclusions and Next Steps
The study found that the ASO initiative mobilized a moderate proportion of different types of
companies to develop and improve HIV/AIDS workplace policies and programs. Although many
managers were not motivated by the incentives to sign up, a significant proportion had an untapped
sense of responsibility to act in the best interests of their employees by joining ASO. The data also
reveal that companies that were eligible for the insurance discount made the greatest
improvements. Thus a financial incentive combined with efforts to tap into managers’ willingness
to respond to the epidemic can be important motivators for certain companies to improve their
workplace environment.
Despite improvements at the workplace, there was no impact on employees’ HIV-related
knowledge and behavior. One reason may be that the focus of ASO was on nondiscriminatory
policies, which help to safeguard workers’ rights but likely do little to foster sexual risk-reduction
behaviors. Also, while TBCA offered companies a menu of materials and services to improve
workplace HIV/AIDS programs, the inputs requested may not have been sufficiently intense to
result in improvements robust enough to make a difference in workers’ knowledge and behaviors.
Therefore, in future endeavors, more attention needs to be paid not only to participation but also to
the program content of HIV/AIDS workplace activities.
Building on the findings of this study, a modified version of the initiative will be scaled up to 25
provinces in Thailand, beginning in late 2003. TBCA has received funding from the Global Fund to
recruit 2,500 workplaces to participate in the new program, in cooperation with the Ministry of
Public Health, the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, business groups, AIA, and local
nongovernmental organizations.
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Introduction
Background
HIV/AIDS in Thailand
Thailand has received international attention as one of the few developing countries to begin to see
the impact of efforts to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS at a national level. Since the onset of a
national AIDS education and prevention campaign in 1990-91, evidence has documented a
reduction in the number of visitors to sex workers, an increase in condom usage, a dramatic decline
in STI prevalence, and substantial reductions in the number of new HIV infections. Data indicate
that the number of new HIV cases in Thailand peaked in the early 1990s, and that an estimated
200,000 new infections have been averted since 1993 (World Bank 2000). Despite the reduction in
new infections, an estimated 700,000 people of Thailand’s total population of 61 million are
currently living with HIV/AIDS. Thailand will continue to face high levels of demand for medical
services as the epidemic matures, and households will continue to face poverty as people living
with HIV progress to more advanced stages of disease.

HIV/AIDS programs in the workplace
The workplace setting is considered an effective environment for delivering HIV/AIDS programs
to a wide range of people who might not otherwise have access to HIV/AIDS prevention education,
and raise their awareness of care and support services. Business can play a vital role in HIV/AIDS
prevention, care, and support efforts, by distributing condoms, providing voluntary counseling and
testing, and expanding access to care and treatment. Mobilizing corporate resources in resourceconstrained regions may prevent further economic and social damage, which after all is in the best
interests of businesses and individuals alike.
Private enterprises responding to the increasing impact of HIV/AIDS on the economy have
initiated workplace programs and policies (for example, see International Labour Organization
2003a; World Economic Forum Undated b). Firms have responded in various ways to the dual
challenges of losing skilled and experienced employees to illness, while simultaneously facing
increased health insurance and training costs (UNAIDS 2002; UNAIDS 1998). These workplace
programs and policies have often been introduced by international bodies or so-called “champion”
enterprises: large companies or umbrella organizations in high HIV prevalence areas that have
realized the importance of creating “HIV/AIDS-friendly” workplace environments (e.g., Durban
Chamber of Commerce, Undated; International Labour Organization 2003b; International Labour
Organization 2003c; International Labour Organisation 2003d; World Economic Forum Undated
a). Trade unions and groups of people living with HIV/AIDS (PLHA) have also been responsible
for the creation of workplace programs (for example Joint United Nations Programme on
HIV/AIDS 2002; Southern African Clothing and Textile Workers' Union 2002; GIPA Undated).
However, despite the growth in HIV/AIDS workplace programs, success to date has been limited:
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the examples set by the “champion” companies have not led to the widespread adoption of similar
schemes across regions or industries. Many enterprises remain unmotivated or unaware of how to
be actively involved in the fight against HIV/AIDS, in part because no mechanism exists to educate
managers about potential benefits and show them how to introduce workplace programs and
policies.
Thailand was selected as an appropriate country in which to pilot this workplace initiative due to
the existence of previous multisectoral HIV/AIDS initiatives by governmental and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In particular, the Thailand Business Coalition on AIDS
(TBCA) had been working with businesses in Thailand to promoting workplace HIV/AIDS
education and prevention programs for employees since its inception in 1993. Although TBCA had
achieved success in encouraging businesses to manage HIV and AIDS in the workplace, most
companies still had difficulty seeing the financial benefit of such schemes, and thus the opportunity
to investigate incentives was particularly timely.

Aims
This research study aimed to explore company managers’ decision-making process in developing
workplace HIV/AIDS programs, and the extent to which incentives could be used to influence this
process.
This study addresses the following research questions:
Feasibility and impact of the initiative
• Can a scheme offering companies a reduction in group-life-insurance rates result in
improvements in workplace HIV/AIDS programs?
• Do improvements in workplace HIV/AIDS programs, as measured through the accreditation
process, result in improvement in the knowledge, attitudes, and behavior (KAB) of company
employees?
Managerial decision-making
• How do managers perceive the costs and benefits of participation in the scheme?
• Why do some companies agree to participate and others refuse to participate in the scheme?

Conceptual Framework
The investigators explored the process and outcomes of offering incentives to encourage
companies to improve their workplace HIV/AIDS policies and programs. They hypothesized that
these incentives would motivate companies to introduce or improve their policies and activities,
which in turn would eventually result in improvements in employees’ knowledge and behaviors, as
shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1 Hypothesized impact of study
Incentives offered

Company joins
ASO

Company complies with ASO
basic requirements:
introduces HIV/AIDS policies

Company introduces
HIV/AIDS programs among
employees

Employees
improve HIV risk
behavior

Study Site and Population
Companies participating in this study were located in Bangkok and nearby provinces1 and in
Chiang Mai and its neighboring province of Lamphun (Figure 2). Bangkok and its surrounding
region were selected since most of Thailand’s companies are located in this area, and TBCA
already had a network there. Chiang Mai, the largest city in northern Thailand, was chosen because
it is the area most affected by the Thai AIDS epidemic, and also has a relatively large and varied
employment base, which includes AIA members, and a high percentage of local ownership.
Lamphun has several industrial estates where a number of companies expressed interest in
participating in ASO.
1

Samutprakarn, Patumthani, Ayuddhaya, Chacheongsao, Nonthaburi, Prachinburi, and Samutsakorn
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Figure 2 Map of Thailand, showing study areas

Thailand

Chiang Mai

Lamphun

Bangkok

N

0
0

200 mi
200 km

8

Workplace AIDS Program in Thailand

Methods
Intervention
Study partners developed an insurance scheme called the AIDS-response Standard Organization
(ASO) that awarded graduated reductions in group-life insurance rates to companies that
demonstrated improvements in their HIV/AIDS workplace policies and activities.
Companies agreeing to implement at least three HIV/AIDS workplace policies would receive a
reduction of 5 to 10 percent off their group life insurance premiums from AIA, Thailand’s largest
insurance provider, if they were AIA clients. Full details of the qualification criteria are shown in
the sidebar below. These criteria and the overall scoring system were developed following two
pilot projects undertaken by TBCA and Horizons during 1998 and 1999, and subsequent
discussions with AIA senior representatives.
As the initiative evolved, TBCA introduced the additional incentive of a certificate awarded by the
directors general of the Department of Disease Control (Ministry of Public Health) and of the
Department of Labour Protection and Welfare (Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare) at a highprofile public ceremony.
For all companies agreeing to participate, TBCA offered assistance to enhance their activities,
including providing educational leaflets, videos, and a mobile exhibition, as well as condoms, peer
education training, counseling and referrals to support groups for HIV-positive employees, and
assistance with writing company HIV/AIDS policies.

Insurance Premium Reduction Qualification Criteria
Companies qualified for the minimum 5 percent reduction if they signed onto a declaration
declaring that they met the three key policy requirements:
• Did not test job applicants for HIV/AIDS.
• Did not test employees for HIV/AIDS.
• Continued to employ workers known to be HIV-positive.
Further reductions up to a maximum 10 percent reduction were awarded to companies that
demonstrated a comprehensive workplace HIV/AIDS program for employees by adhering
to the three basic policies and additionally:
• Informing their employees of the company’s HIV/AIDS policies.
• Maintaining confidentiality of the HIV status of employees.
• Providing assistance to HIV-positive employees.
• Making training and information on HIV/AIDS available to employees, including
promotion and distribution of condoms.
• Being involved with HIV/AIDS activities in the wider community.
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Partners
TBCA implemented the intervention, monitored standards and compliance, and managed data
collection and analysis. As an NGO receiving donor funding, and at the same time a business
association seeking private sector membership, TBCA staff had multiple potentially overlapping or
conflicting roles and responsibilities. Thus the close involvement of other partners was maintained
to ensure data quality.
Horizons was responsible for the operations research component of the study and supervised the
data collection to ensure data quality and accurate analysis and reporting of results.
AIA, Thailand’s largest insurance provider, was responsible for administering the insurance
premium reductions among member companies.
AusAID, the overseas aid program of the Australian Government, provided funding for the press
conference and for questionnaire development.

Launch
The project was launched in June 2000 at a high-profile press conference attended by
representatives of UNAIDS, WHO, and the Thai government (Ministry of Public Health, Ministry
of Social Welfare), as well as the general public. Representatives of local businesses were invited
from a list of company contacts compiled by AIA and TBCA, and from commercial associations
and personal networks of the TBCA board members. Television and print media representatives
were also present. Materials distributed at the press conference included information on the
intervention and the partners in Thai and English.

Recruitment
The press conference generated coverage in both the English and Thai language media. TBCA
followed up on the initial publicity by contacting the company representatives who had attended
the launch and representatives of other invited companies.
TBCA staff provided company representatives with further details of ASO sent by mail or fax. This
information was followed up with telephone calls to the personnel manager, with the aim of setting
up an appointment to discuss and market ASO. At these meetings, the TBCA team member began
to establish a one-on-one relationship with the company representative, and provided a package
detailing the requirements and benefits to the company of joining ASO and being involved in the
research activities.
TBCA aimed to enroll 150 companies, most of which were expected to be AIA clients. However,
recruitment did not proceed according to plan. Two surprising findings emerged, in light of which
recruitment policies were changed:
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First, it became apparent that recruitment of AIA member companies was lower than expected. By
the close of recruitment in May 2001, only 125 companies had enrolled in ASO, of which 42
received AIA insurance. This finding suggested that the value of the insurance premium reduction
that was being offered was an insufficient incentive for companies to join ASO.
Second, many companies without AIA life insurance were still interested in joining the scheme,
even though they were unable to take advantage of the premium reductions on offer without
changing insurance provider. Furthermore, it was clear that the costs and complexities of changing
insurance providers outweighed any potential advantage of reduced premiums.
Study investigators changed the recruitment criteria and incentive scheme to recognize both of
these developments. They developed a certification scheme to visibly recognize and honor all
companies committing to participation in the project. Certificates were signed and presented by a
high-ranking representative of the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Labour and Social
Welfare at a public awards ceremony, designed to publicly honor all participating companies for
their interest in the health and welfare of their workers, regardless of whether they were AIA
clients.
Thus, the final intervention design upon which results are reported in this report includes both
types of incentives offered to companies: insurance premium reductions and publicly awarded
certificates.

Data Collection
Data sources
This study used the data sources detailed in Table 1. Data collection began in May 2000 and
continued until April 20022.

Data entry and analysis
Data analysis was conducted using SPSS version 10.0. Unless otherwise stated, the statistical tests
reported were Pearson chi2. An asterisk (*) indicates results considered significant at the 0.05 level
or below, and a double asterisk (**) indicates results considered significant at the 0.01 level or
below. Throughout this report, note that percentages may not total 100 percent due to rounding
error.

2

All data collection instruments are available upon request from horizons@pcdc.org
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Table 1 Data collection methods and denominators
Data collection
method
Recruitment checklist

Date/s administered

n

August 2000 - May 2001

857

Company
implementation
survey, including costeffectiveness
estimates

Round 1:
May 2000 - May 2001

125

Round 2:
November 2001 - April 2002

117

Employees selfadministered
questionnaire

Round 1:
May 2000 - May 2001

9,603

Round 2:
November 2001 - April 2002

7,850

Company participation
data, including indepth interviews

July - August 2001

Companies that joined ASO:
99
Companies that did not join ASO: 144
Survey total:
243
In-depth interviews:
23

Recruitment checklist
Between August 2000 and May 2001, 857 companies (706 in Bangkok and its surrounding
provinces and 151 in Chiang Mai and its neighboring province Lamphun3) were invited to join
ASO. TBCA recorded company characteristics using a recruitment checklist, including size and
type of company, number of employees insured, type of insurance, and reasons for joining or not
joining the ASO project.

Company implementation survey
For each company that agreed to join the scheme, TBCA carried out a structured survey with a
personnel manager or other high-level company official, exploring management decisions in
relation to the project and the extent to which the required policies had been implemented. The
questionnaire, which took an average of about 45 minutes to complete, was administered twice:
once at the time of recruitment to ASO, and once in the year following the introduction of the ASO
policies. Accreditation scores were assigned to indicate company performance in the following five
fields:

3

Unless stated, Bangkok refers to the city and its surrounding provinces, and Chiang Mai refers to both
Chiang Mai and Lamphun.
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•
•
•
•
•

Policy announcement.
Confidentiality policy.
Assistance to HIV-positive employees.
HIV prevention activities at the workplace.
Social contribution.

The pre-post intervention design of this study component enabled researchers to observe changes in
company policies and programs over the period of the intervention.

Cost-effectiveness estimates
The company questionnaire included a form to record monetary costs and benefits of the scheme,
including the costs of personnel time and effort, the benefits of savings from the premium rate
reduction, productivity gains, and health care savings from improved employee health.

Employee self-administered questionnaire
A self-administered questionnaire (SAQ) was distributed to at least 100 employees at each
company, or to 100 percent of the workforce for small companies. Total sample size was 9,603 at
Round 1 and 7,850 at Round 2. As with the company manager questionnaires, the SAQs were
administered on two occasions—once before and once after the introduction of the intervention—
which allowed examination of pre-post changes in employee knowledge, attitudes, and behavior.
Sample size calculations indicated that these large numbers of employees were required to detect
small changes with sufficient power from the initial levels assumed.
The time required for individual employees to fill out the SAQ was approximately 15 minutes.
Because of restrictions imposed by company management, in only a few cases was TBCA able to
directly distribute the SAQ to the employees. In most cases, TBCA made arrangements with the
manager to distribute the SAQ to the employees. These arrangements included distributing the
questionnaire to every section of the workplace in a proportional way so as to reflect the
company’s gender balance. The companies took between two and four weeks for all employees to
complete the questionnaire.

Company participation data
Realizing the difficulties of recruiting companies, and in particular AIA clients, to join ASO, the
researchers and TBCA decided to conduct a qualitative exploration of the reasons why some
companies agreed to join while others refused to participate in the program. As a result, between
July and August 2001 a questionnaire was mailed to all 857 companies that had been originally
invited to join ASO. The questionnaire covered:
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Managers’ attitudes about HIV/AIDS workplace activities.
How they received information about the project.
Knowledge about ASO.
Companies’ HIV/AIDS policies.
Reaction to the financial incentives and the certificate.
The decision-making process in the company.
Companies’ HIV/AIDS activities.

Qualitative data quoted below are labeled according to the size of the company4 and whether the
informant was a manager of a company that did or did not join ASO.

Response rates
Researchers mailed the qualitative questionnaires to all of the 857 companies that had originally
been invited to join the project. All companies that had subsequently joined ASO were followed up
with a series of telephone calls. Companies that had not joined were followed up with less
intensity: only 30 percent, systematically sampled by the date that they declined to join, were
followed up with telephone calls.
Response rates (Table 2) were 79 percent among companies that joined and 20 percent of those that
had not joined. Caution should be taken in the interpretation of the views of companies that had not
joined ASO, given the low response rate.

Table 2 Responses to mailed questionnaires
Type of
company

Questionnaires
sent

Responses
received

Response rate
%

Joined ASO

125

99

79

Did not join ASO

732

144

20

Total

857

243

28

In addition, researchers conducted 23 in-depth interviews with company decision makers in
Bangkok to explore their reasons for participation or nonparticipation. A stratified random
sampling method was used to ensure that AIA members and nonmembers, and companies of
varying size were represented. Interviews examined managers’ perceptions of the costs and
benefits of ASO and their personal attitudes toward HIV/AIDS.

4

Cut-off point between large and small companies is defined as 200 employees.
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Study limitations
The use of probability sampling techniques was not feasible in this study. The companies selected
for inclusion in the survey samples were based on a list compiled mainly through the personal
contacts of TBCA staff (see section below on Recruitment strategies). The inability to ensure that
employees were randomly sampled limits the generalizations that can be made from the data.
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Results
In this section, we present combined results from the different data collection tools explained
above.

Company Recruitment and Participation
Respondent profile
By May 2001, when recruitment for the first round of data collection closed, 125 companies had
joined ASO, including 75 from Bangkok and neighboring provinces and 50 from Chiang Mai and
Lamphun. By round 2, the total number of participating companies declined to 117, due to a few
companies dropping out of the project or going out of business.
Table 3 shows the descriptive characteristics of the companies signing up to the HIV/AIDS
workplace policies. Over half of all companies joining ASO were factories. Other types of
enterprises joining the scheme included hotels (particularly in Chiang Mai) and commercial and
professional firms. Most companies joining ASO were not AIA clients and were therefore not
entitled to a financial benefit. Companies in Chiang Mai were less likely to be AIA clients than
those in Bangkok. The companies participating in Bangkok were generally larger than those in
Chiang Mai.

Recruitment strategies
TBCA compiled its list of company contacts through various means, including personal and
professional networks, directory listings, and publicizing the project at the meeting of the chamber
of commerce.
Personal contacts were significantly the most successful contact method (Figure 3), although this
group was also the smallest in number contacted. Through this method TBCA was able to directly
meet the decision maker, explain the details of ASO, and obtain a rapid decision. With other, less
personal strategies TBCA representatives had to work their way up the company structure, using a
contact list that may have been out of date, hoping to find the appropriate individual with decisionmaking power to determine the company’s participation.
The important point in deciding to join or not was reaching the executive. We had to have
enough information for them to see the picture. We had to explain to them so that they
could understand. We had to have enough information to see both the benefits and the
disadvantages of the project.
Assistant manager, small ASO participating company
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Table 3 Characteristics of participating companies
Round 1
Characteristics

Bangkok
n = 75
%

Round 2

Chiang Mai
n = 50
%

Total
n = 125
%

Bangkok
n = 69
%

Chiang Mai
n = 48
%

Total
n = 117
%

Type of
business
Factory

64

38

54

64

35

52

Hotel

25

36

30

25

38

30

Commercial
services

4

20

10

4

21

11

Professional
firms

7

6

6

7

6

7

No

61

74

66

65

85

74

Yes

39

26

34

35

15

27

472

153

325

485

147

310

Min

24

32

24

26

33

26

Max

8,500

2,677

8,500

9,000

1,960

9,000

AIA clients

Number of
employees
Median

Percentage of invited
companies participated

Figure 3 Participation by company contact method
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Personal
networks
n = 57

According to in-depth interviews with company managers, the lengthy recruitment process
discouraged some managers from participating. Interviewers also discovered a variety of
misperceptions about the initiative. For example, some managers declined to participate because
they incorrectly perceived the scheme to be a marketing strategy of the insurance provider AIA.
The fact that AIA is the sponsor of the project run by TBCA creates an image that is too
business oriented. If the project were run by the government or by the Insurance Association we
wouldn’t see it as an AIA project, but as a cooperative project. We would see it as a social
issue, a social security issue, or a public health issue. Thus it would have a different image. The
way it is now it seems that TBCA is AIA. This is my belief.
Manager, large nonparticipating company

Convincing companies to join the project proved time consuming. Numerous follow-up contacts
were often necessary before company managers could be convinced to join the ASO project. Only
12 percent of companies joined after the first contact, with up to seven contacts necessary before
some companies decided to participate, thus making the project more labor-intensive than expected
(Figure 4). Many companies that did not join the project were also contacted numerous times
before finally deciding not to participate in the project.

Figure 4 Companies agreeing to join ASO, by number of contacts
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Note: This graph illustrates only the results of 121 companies that eventually decided to join the project.
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Decision-making process
Reasons why companies joined ASO
Managers of companies joining the scheme were asked to list their motivations for participation.
The most commonly given reason for joining the ASO project was a sense of social responsibility
to employees and to society as a whole (Figure 5): 57 percent of company managers joining ASO
said that it was because they wanted to establish HIV/AIDS workplace activities to help their
workers and members of their community.
The incentive for private enterprises to be involved in the fight against AIDS is not simply
about money or certificates, but it is about us giving our workers greater knowledge and
providing our workers with additional trainings at the workplace.
Manager, large ASO participating company
The second most popular motivation for joining, mentioned by 30 percent of companies recruited,
was to know the results of the company and employee surveys and to find out how their policies
and employee characteristics compared with other companies. This finding highlights the
importance of a publicly recognized standard (e.g., through government endorsement or a national
Code of Practice) to provide guidance on appropriate responses to HIV/AIDS in the workplace.
We joined ASO so to know what our standard was. We wanted to know what areas we
needed to improve [in relation to HIV/AIDS]; we were more interested in that. ...we joined
to see where our company was lacking, or what we had to do extra to help our employees
who are at risk of contracting HIV/AIDS.
Manager, large ASO participating company

Figure 5 Reasons why companies joined ASO
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Note: n = 96 responses based on 125 companies recruited, multiple responses allowed.
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Other

Almost all managers of companies that joined (96 percent) agreed with the statement that knowing
about employees’ HIV knowledge and risk behavior would help them to plan prevention activities.
Even among companies that did not join ASO, 79 percent of managers agreed with this statement
and thought that such information would have been useful, although they had evidently declined to
participate in the scheme for other reasons (see below).
The financial benefit of a reduction in the costs of group life insurance premiums was cited as a
reason to join ASO by only 11 percent of company managers. Many of the managers who decided
not to join indicated during their interviews that they perceived the financial rewards as being too
limited, considering the effort involved.
I believe that a company with 5,000 employees would save about 100,000 baht on their
insurance. This isn’t that much. To be honest, it is only a small amount, seeing that we
would have to invest time, it would be time consuming and complicated. If we can save
100,000 baht but we have to do all these things I wouldn’t want to join.
Manager, large nonparticipating company
The interviews with managers confirmed to researchers that the incentive of a 10 percent premium
reduction had not provided sufficient motivation to outweigh the financial costs of joining ASO,
among participants and nonparticipants alike. Opinions varied as to whether a larger incentive
could have provided additional motivation for ASO recruitment. More than half (55 percent) of
managers whose companies joined agreed that a greater financial incentive would be helpful, but a
notably lower level of 40 percent of nonjoining managers gave the same answer, indicating that a
substantial remnant remained unattracted by the additional financial incentive.
None of the company mangers questioned indicated that the entitlement to a certificate had been
the reason why they had joined ASO. Managers indicated that their companies would be happy to
receive the certificate, but alone it did not provide sufficient motivation for participation.
I see the ASO certificate as an outcome of being involved in the project. But if you ask me
personally if the ASO certificate was a motivation to join ASO, I would have to say no.
Manager, large ASO participating company
Managers of participating and nonparticipating companies alike viewed the certificate as a
potential endorsement of their company’s concern for the wellbeing of their employees and their
willingness to help society. One manager of a small company that joined ASO, referring to the
certificate, stated that he hoped:
…that businesses that contact us would see us as a good company. That we would be seen
as being believable, that we have good working conditions, that we care for the health of
our employees. So if we get it, it would be good, others would see us at taking care of our
employees’ health.
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Manager comments indicated that in order for the ASO certificate to be distinguishable from many
other certificates offered to private enterprises, high-profile backing from a well-known and
important person or institution was required.
On the question of certificates our hotel has so many that I do not know where to put them.
If it is not a certificate for the environment, it is for service, or one that comes from guests,
from the Thai Tourist Authority, from our parent company, or recommendations from
magazines. I am not interested in the certificate unless it came from someone really
important like the UN or someone from the royal family that is interested in this topic.
Manager, large ASO participating company

Reasons why companies did not join ASO
Researchers asked managers of nonparticipating companies why they had declined to become
involved. The main reasons cited were inconvenience and lack of interest in the scheme, each
mentioned by almost 40 percent of respondents (Figure 6). The time and personnel requirements of
administering the complicated procedural requirements of the project were specifically mentioned
as disincentives.
I can’t remember exactly about the details of the project, but I remember we had to
complete all these questionnaires. Also, I remember that the process of the project was too
complicated. We had to do all these things, thus it was too complicated for us. If you ask
did I see the benefit of the project I would have to say yes, but we had to do all these tasks,
as if we didn’t have any other work to do.
Manager, large nonparticipating company

Figure 6 Reasons why companies did not join ASO
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n = 769 responses based on 732 companies that decided not to join, multiple responses allowed.
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Interviews with managers indicated that time concerns were a substantial worry for companies
choosing not to participate. Managers were asked whether they had had problems making time for
HIV/AIDS workplace activities at the time that the ASO project was being promoted: 62 percent of
nonparticipating managers indicated that they had indeed faced such problems, significantly more
than those that did join, of whom 44 percent reported time management difficulties (p = .006).
To be honest, we have so much to do. For example, last year I covered 170 different topics
during the training. Each year there are 365 days and I spent two days for each topic, and
for some topics I have to spend extra time. Thus, I decided not to join the project; if I had
joined it would have meant that I wouldn’t be able to do many other things.
Manager, large nonparticipating company
The second most commonly cited reason for nonparticipation was a lack of interest in the project,
mentioned by 36 percent of nonparticipating companies. One managing director of a large
company that did not join ASO felt that there was no need to introduce HIV/AIDS workplace
activities because “HIV employees just quit when they are unable to work and that there is no
undue workplace conflict.” A further 6 percent of company managers indicated that they did not
think that their employees faced an HIV/AIDS problem or engaged in activities that placed them at
risk of the disease. The lack of interest and knowledge about the risks of employees and the
responsibilities of employers, even in these areas of relatively high HIV prevalence, indicates a
need for widespread education programs among high-level company management.
I don’t believe that our employees are at risk of HIV/AIDS. First, our employees are well
educated and second, we are providing HIV/AIDS information twice a year. Thus the
percentage of employees at risk would be very low.
Manager, large nonparticipating company
One in ten managers stated that the small size of their company made an investment in joining the
ASO not worthwhile in terms of the ability to locate and assign resources (time, money,
responsible personnel) to the project.
The main reason why we didn’t join was that we have a very small workforce. We only
have 17 workers and that includes me.
Manager, small nonparticipating company
A further 6 percent of companies did not join ASO because its requirements were in direct
contravention of their existing policies (e.g., HIV testing of employees). A manager of a large
company that did not join ASO indicated that despite the pressure on his company to change their
policy, they were unwilling to do so:
I feel very awkward when I go to meetings and meet NGO workers. Sometimes they
interrogate me [about the key policies], as if I was a criminal. I tell these NGO workers
that we can’t write the policy, as they would want. Such a policy would be more suitable
for a foundation, not for a business. I feel that if we look at it in a business way, the way we
treat our employees is good.
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Levels of participation
Company characteristics
The total number of companies invited to join ASO was 857. Participation in the first round of data
collection was 125 companies (15 percent of those invited to join). Researchers used the
recruitment and participation datasets to determine which factors were associated with higher
levels of company participation (Table 4).
Higher levels of participation were observed among service and hotel companies than among
factories or among professional or commercial firms. This association may have been due to the
strong personal contacts of the TBCA board with international hotel chains, making it easier to
contact and convince the hotels to participate in this project. Alternatively, perhaps employees in
these industries have more direct involvement with clients, and thus managers might be more
concerned about presenting a good public image to clients.
Researchers investigated a possible association between company size and participation level,
hypothesizing that larger companies might be associated with higher participation than smaller
companies, who face a proportionately higher cost burden. The maximum insurance reduction
represented a constant 10 percent off premiums for companies of all sizes, but the burden per
worker of accompanying implementation costs of the workplace HIV/AIDS policies was greater on
smaller companies with less-developed organizational infrastructures. However, this hypothesis
was not definitively found to be supported by the data in Table 4 (or additional analysis5). Among
AIA client companies, there was a statistically significant relationship between ASO participation
levels and the number of employees insured by AIA, in that companies with more insured
employees were more likely to participate. Although the percentage reduction remained constant,
the absolute value of the financial incentive was greater for companies with more insured
employees, which may have represented a motivation for larger companies to join ASO.
ASO participation was significantly higher in Chiang Mai than Bangkok, possibly due to
confounding by the longstanding personal relationships between TBCA staff and provincial
businesses. This association might also reflect the greater ease of communication and travel that
exists in Chiang Mai, a much smaller city than the capital Bangkok. Another possible explanation
is that the high HIV prevalence rate in northern Thailand could have motivated companies in
Chiang Mai to act.

5

Mean company size among 121 companies that joined was 607 employees, compared to 422 employees for
671 that did not join; p > 0.05 by independent sample t-test.
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Table 4 Company participation in ASO, by company characteristics
Company characteristics

n = 857

Significance
(Pearson chi2)

Service/hotel

Companies
participating
%
33

114

< .001**

Professional

18

28

Commercial

14

91

Factory

12

567

1-100 employees

10

274

101-300 employees

15

253

> 301 employees

19

330

1-300 employees insured with AIA

22

91

300 plus employees insured with AIA

46

44

Bangkok area

11

706

Chiang Mai area

33

151

Head office

18

468

Branch/sub-contractor

11

352

55

94

33

119

24

17

AIA member only

26

106

TBCA member only

11

165

Member of both AIA and TBCA

41

29

Not a member of either

12

528

Previous experience with private
insurance (any kind)
Life insurance

16

463

.682

19

224

.091

16

127

.863

8

160

.001**

14

212

.169

Thai ownershipa
Joint venture companies
International companies

a

a

Health insurance
Accident insurance
Group insurance
Data source: recruitment checklist except where indicated.
a
Company participation data
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0.06

.005**

< .001**

.003**

.001**

< .001**
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Analysis of both the recruitment and participation datasets indicated that participation was
significantly higher among Thai-owned than internationally owned companies and at head offices
rather than at branch offices. These associations may be due to the fact that TBCA staff found it
easier to communicate the advantages of ASO in Thai with local senior Thai managers, or because
the decision to evaluate joining ASO may have been more complex in companies where the
decision-making powers were located outside the country or region.
A small number of companies that were TBCA members with AIA life insurance had high
participation levels, reflecting the efforts made at the start of the initiative to contact and develop
relationships with both AIA members, who could take advantage of the insurance premium
reduction, and TBCA members with whom staff had preexisting contacts.
There was no obvious relationship between companies’ participation and their previous experience
with other insurance schemes. Participation was not found to be associated with the sex ratio of
employees, the balance of skilled and unskilled workers, or the position of the decision maker
approached.

Managers’ views
Researchers also explored the links between company commitment to HIV/AIDS issues, managers’
perceptions of the ASO contact process, and eventual company participation. The surveys included
questions about a wide range of issues regarding managers’ views of HIV/AIDS, workplace
activities, and the ASO contact process. Only those aspects found to be significantly associated
with participation are shown in Tables 5 and 6.
Participation was highest among companies whose managers expressed personal involvement in
HIV/AIDS issues and companies that had already demonstrated commitment to previous
HIV/AIDS activities. ASO participation was significantly higher among companies with any
previous history of undertaking workplace HIV/AIDS than among those to whom HIV/AIDS
activities represented a new venture. Managers who believed that HIV/AIDS is an issue for
companies to be involved in and those who felt that HIV/AIDS workplace activities are worth the
cost were more likely to decide that their companies should participate in ASO than were managers
from other companies. Results also indicate the importance of establishing a solid and credible
relationship with company managers.
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Table 5 Company participation in ASO, by company activities
Company characteristics

Companies
participating

Companies
not
participating

Significance
(Pearson
chi2)

%

n

%

n

N

Undertaken AIDS activities in last
3 years

57

54

34

46

100

Did not undertake such activities

43

40

66

90

130

136

230

94

Total
Undertook AIDS activities in last
year

47

44

31

42

86

Did not undertake such activities

53

50

69

93

143

135

229

94

Total

< .001**

.016*

Data source: Company participation data

The qualitative research revealed that inappropriate aspects of the contact process negatively
influenced company managers. Although some of these managers represented companies that
eventually went on to join ASO, other managers were discouraged by these factors and refrained
from joining:
From the beginning when we were contacted by TBCA, asking us to undertake the
questionnaire, we weren’t impressed with how they contacted us. The contacts were time
consuming, which made us wonder whether the project would be successful as well as
making us believe that TBCA wasn’t serious about the project. We couldn’t see what the
results of the projects would be. We weren’t sure what the purpose of the project was,
whether it was simply to promote AIA, or a way for someone to make money.
Manager, small ASO participating company
I didn’t like the way that they contacted us. The fax wasn’t clear; it was unreadable. I
couldn’t understand what I was reading. It wasn’t two-way communication. After I
received the fax I didn’t hear anything from them for a number of months. It just wasn’t
good manners; you have to give someone a call before you send them a fax. Once sending
us a fax you have to send someone to contact us. A project like this you have to have close
contact, isn’t that the case.
Manager, large nonparticipating company
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Table 6 Participation and managers’ perceptions about HIV/AIDS and ASO
Companies
participating

Personally I am happy to get
involved in the HIV/AIDS issue
Agree
Disagree

Disagree

n

46

44

32

45

89

54

52

68

96

148

141

237

96

Disagree

67

50

71

138

32

32

50

70

102

141

240

99

21

20

39

54

74

79

77

61

86

163

140

237

Total
Organizing workplace HIV/AIDS
activities is worth the investment
for the company
Agree
Disagree

N

68

Total
Workplace HIV/AIDS activities will
increase the personnel staff
workload
Agree

Significance
(Pearson
chi2)

%

Total
I think it possible that there have
been HIV/AIDS cases at my
workplace
Agree

Companies
not
participating
%
n

97

89

88

76

105

193

11

11

24

33

44

138

237

Total

99

.03*

.008**

.003**

.012*

HIV/AIDS protection is the
employee’s responsibility
Agree

45

45

65

89

134

Disagree

55

55

36

49

103

138

237

Total
Were you confident that the
person introducing the program
was believable?
Agree
Disagree

99

94

90

77

104

194

6

6

23

31

37

135

231

Total

96

Data source: Company participation data
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.004**

.001**

Workplace Impact
Accreditation system
The scoring system, based on previous research conducted by TBCA, was designed to take into
account both the existence of a policy within company management circles (whether formally
documented or informally acknowledged) and its public announcement to employees.
Companies were first scored on their compliance with the three key anti-discriminatory workplace
policies that determined the entitlement to the financial incentive and certificate:
• No blood tests for job applicants.
• No blood tests for employees.
• Allowing people known to be HIV-positive to continue working.
Companies whose policies did not reach these minimum measures required were not entitled to the
financial incentives or the certificate.
Researchers also investigated companies’ compliance with eight additional policy and program
areas, for which they could gain additional credit:
• Announcing the key anti-discriminatory policies to employees.
• Maintaining employee confidentiality.
• Providing assistance to HIV-positive employees.
• Providing staff training on HIV/AIDS.
• Disseminating HIV/AIDS information (leaflets, etc.) to employees.
• Promoting condoms among employees.
• Supplementary HIV/AIDS activities (e.g., working committee / peer group / counselor,
reimbursement of medical expenses related to STIs).
• Being involved in community HIV/AIDS activities.
Scores taking into account all these multiple dimensions were calibrated to a possible maximum
total of 100 points. Maximum scores in each area are shown in Table 8.

Change in total scores
Using data from the company evaluations before and after implementation of the policies,
researchers found that 82 percent of the participating companies had improved upon their total
accreditation score, demonstrating real improvements in HIV/AIDS policies at the workplace. The
mean accreditation score in round 1 was 37, improving to 51 in round 2 (p < .001, independent
sample t-test). Figure 7 shows the distribution of accreditation scores achieved in the first and
second round, indicating that companies’ policies improved significantly.
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Figure 7 Distribution of company evaluation scores, by round
Round 1 (n = 125)
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Changes in compliance with the three key policies
The number of companies with policies directly contravening the three basic requirements of ASO
decreased between the first and second round (Table 7), although only one of these policy
measures showed statistical significance. The number of companies with explicit requirements for
blood tests from employees and job applicants, as well as the number of companies refusing to
allow HIV-positive employees to continue working, all decreased between rounds. Several
companies that joined ASO but were found to be noncompliant by the second round lost their
entitlement to a rate reduction and certificate (but continued to be included in the analysis).
Although policy improvements were evident, many companies still had not documented their
implementation of these measures, so further room for improvement clearly remains.

Changes in compliance in the eight additional policy areas
Participating companies recorded significant improvements in all areas, shown in Table 8.
Improvements of the greatest magnitude were observed in the scores for assistance to HIV-positive
employees and supplementary HIV/AIDS activities.
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Table 7 Key policy compliance, by round
Significanceb
(Pearson chi2)

Round 1
n = 125
n
%

Round 2
n = 117
n

%

Requireda

26

21

14

12

Not required – unwritten

85

68

83

71

Not required - written

14

11

20

17

Requireda

12

10

4

3

Not required – unwritten

96

77

90

77

Not required - written

17

14

23

20

Not alloweda

23

18

5

4

Allowed – unwritten

88

70

95

80

Allowed - written

14

11

18

15

Blood tests for applicants
.064

Blood tests for employees
.053

HIV-positive continue working

a
b

.001**

Indicates noncompliance with key policy.
Significance values calculated for change in key policy noncompliance only.

Table 8 Accreditation scores, by policy area
Maximum
score

Mean score

Significance
(t-test)

Policy announcement

5

Round 1
n = 125
1.9

Confidentiality policy

10

3.9

5.2

13

.001**

Assistance to HIVpositive employees

20

13.4

16.7

17

< .001**

Staff training

30

5.9

9.3

11

.004**

Information dissemination

12

5.6

7.6

17

< .001**

Condom promotion

10

2.4

3.9

15

< .001**

Supplementary HIV/AIDS
activities

8

1.9

3.4

19

< .001**

Social contribution

5

1.7

2.5

16

.017*

100

36.7

14

< .001**

Total
a

Round 2
n = 117
2.4

Percent
change of
mean
scorea
10

51

.016*

Difference between mean scores in the two rounds multiplied by the proportion of the maximum of the total
maximum score (e.g., for policy announcement: (2.4 - 1.9) X 100/5 = 10)
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Policy announcement
The maximum score of five points was awarded to companies at which the three key policies had
been written down and announced to all their employees. The mean score for policy announcement
increased from 1.9 in round 1 to 2.4 in round 2, out of a maximum of 5 points. By the second
round, all except two of the companies with written key policies had announced them to all of their
employees.
Table 9 below shows the extent to which companies with unwritten policies informed their
employees of their implementation. Among companies with unwritten policies there was no
statistically significant improvement in awareness among employees. However, for each of the key
policies there was a marked increase in communication of the policy at least to the managerial
staff. Further, there was a marked decrease among companies at which only the policymaker knew
of the existence of those unwritten policies.

Table 9 Knowledge of key policies in companies with unwritten HIV/AIDS policies
Policy

Round 1
%

Round 2
%

n = 82

n = 83

All employees are told

23

28

Just managers are told

37

68

5

0

35

5

n = 94

n = 90

All employees are told

48

47

Just managers are told

27

48

7

3

18

2

n = 86

n = 94

All employees are told

15

12

Just managers are told

49

80

Just responsible officers are told

12

5

Only policymakers know

24

3

No blood tests for applicants

Just responsible officers are told
Only policymakers know
No blood tests for employees

Just responsible officers are told
Only policymakers know
HIV-positive employees allowed to
continue to work

Significance
(Pearson chi2)
< .001**

< .001**

< .001**

Note: In both the variables “No blood tests for applicants” and “No blood tests for employees” there is a cell
with fewer than five cases.
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Confidentiality
A maximum score of 10 points was awarded to companies with policies stating that no employee
needed to report his or her HIV status and ensuring confidentiality to employees who revealed their
status in order to change positions.
Between the two rounds there was an increase in the number of companies that had a policy to
maintain confidentiality, rising from two-thirds of all the companies to 88 percent. The mean
evaluation score for confidentiality increased from 3.9 in round 1 to 5.2 in round 2, out of a
maximum of 10 points.
Assistance to HIV-positive employees
A maximum score of 20 points was awarded to companies with mechanisms in place to provide
assistance to HIV-positive employees, such as flexible job requirements, nonsegregation of HIVpositive employees, and the intention to maintain the benefits of HIV-positive people at the same
level of other staff.
Table 8 above showed that the mean score in this area increased significantly during the period of
the intervention, from 13.4 in round 1, to 16.7 in round 2, out of a maximum of 20 points. The
number of companies with policies in place for the assistance of HIV-positive employees rose from
86 percent of the companies to 97 percent during the study. Some of the improved policies put in
place included commitments not to reduce regular benefits to HIV-positive employees; enabling
HIV-positive employees to move positions to suit their health; paying the employee’s extra costs,
such as medical costs and social insurance funds until the person’s death; and permitting HIVpositive employees to work in the same location as HIV-negative workers (Table 10). By the
second round of the survey, 100 percent of companies had instituted policies not to reduce regular
benefits to HIV-positive employees and to ensure that HIV-positive employees have the same
rights as other workers.
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Table 10 Details of company policies to assist HIV-positive employees
HIV/AIDS policies in the workplace to:

Round 1
%

Round 2
%

n = 125
86

n = 117
97

n = 107

n = 114

99

100

.301

Affirm that HIV-positive employees have the same
rights as other workers

94

100

.010*

Enable HIV-positive employees to move posts to suit
their health

79

96

< .001**

Enable HIV-positive employees to work in the same
location as HIV-negative workers

88

97

.006**

Allow HIV-positive employee to leave work based on
doctor’s advice

94

96

.480

The five policies above cover other chronic diseases

86

99

< .001**

Keep HIV-positive employee in employment as long
as possible

92

97

.056

Give extra work if the HIV-positive employee wants
to earn extra income

4

3

.639

Pay all benefits to the HIV-positive employee if she
or he is dismissed

45

43

.779

Pay extra costs, such as medical costs and social
insurance funds until the person’s death

51

70

.003**

Help affected family with education scholarship for
their children or to allow spouse to work

14

19

.293

Assist HIV-positive employees (generally)
Among companies with workplace policies to
assist HIV-positive employees
Maintain benefits to HIV-positive employees

Significance
(Pearson
chi2)
.001**

Staff training
The staff training score carried a maximum of 30 points based on the proportion of staff who
received HIV/AIDS-related training in the past year and in the last three years.
During the period of the intervention, the mean score improved from 5.9 to 9.3, out of a maximum
of 30 points (Table 8). The distribution of companies reporting the proportion of employees trained
on HIV/AIDS in the last year improved significantly by the second round of the survey (Table 11).
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Table 11 Employees receiving HIV/AIDS training
Round 1
%

Round 2
%

n = 122

n = 116

No one was trained

64

54

Up to 25 percent of employees were trained

25

39

More than 25 percent of employees were
trained

12

23

n = 122

n = 114

No one was trained

54

47

Up to 25 percent of employees were trained

25

25

More than 25 percent of employees were
trained

21

28

Employees trained on HIV/AIDS in last year

Employees trained on HIV/AIDS in last
three years

Significance
(Pearson chi2)

.023*

.445

Information dissemination
Information dissemination scores were calculated from the number and frequency of activities
conducted. Two points were awarded for each method used to disseminate information to their
employees (including brochures, calendars, posters, notice boards, exhibitions, a devoted column in
the company magazine, announcements through the intercom, videos, and in-house information
centers).
The mean score for the two rounds increased from 5.6 to 7.6, out of a maximum of 12 points
(Table 8). The proportion of companies that had campaigns to increase HIV/AIDS knowledge in
the last year increased significantly: from 78 percent at round 1 to 93 percent by the second survey
(Table 12). Among these companies, information dissemination activities that increased in
popularity included leaflet distribution, integrating HIV/AIDS information into company meetings
and on orientation days, and broadcasting HIV/AIDS information on company public address (PA)
systems or videos.
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Table 12 Companies disseminating HIV/AIDS information
Round 1
%

Round 2
%

n = 125

n = 117

78

93

n = 98

n = 109

Distributed HIV/AIDS leaflets

69

92

< .001**

Used boards/posters

90

91

.786

HIV/AIDS exhibition

28

40

.059

HIV/AIDS column in company journal

19

14

.263

Broadcast HIV/AIDS information on company PA
system or showed videos to employees

20

33

.046*

HIV/AIDS center

10

10

.961

Integrated HIV/AIDS information into special
company events

30

39

.151

Integrated HIV/AIDS information into company
meetings and on orientation days

35

57

.001**

Organized HIV/AIDS activities with other
organizations

24

27

.530

Visited employees with AIDS

26

23

.639

Company campaign to increase HIV/AIDS
knowledge in last year

Significance
(Pearson chi2)

.001**

Condom promotion
Condom promotion scores were calculated from the number of condom training sessions, condom
demonstrations, and condoms distributed to employees and carried a maximum score of ten points.
The mean score rose significantly, from 2.4 at round 1 to 3.9 at round 2, out of a maximum of 10
points (Table 8). Companies promoting condoms at the workplace increased from just over half in
round 1 to three-quarters of the companies in round 2 (Table 13). Among these, the proportion of
companies distributing condoms at the workplace increased from 89 to 99 percent, which was
statistically significant.
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Table 13 Companies with condom promotion activities
Round 1
%

Round 2
%

n = 125

n = 117

53

75

n = 65

n = 88

Taught condom use

37

43

.436

Distributed condoms

89

99

.008**

8

13

.337

Condom promotion
Of these…

Sold condoms

Significance
(Pearson chi2)
< .001**

Supplementary HIV/AIDS activities
Supplementary HIV/AIDS activities at the workplace carried a maximum score of eight points.
Two points were awarded for each of the following activities: having a company HIV/AIDS
working committee, HIV peer group, or HIV counselor, and allowing employees to be reimbursed
for medical expenses related to STIs.
Scores in this area increased from 1.9 to 3.4, out of a maximum of 8 points (Table 8). There were
significant improvements in the proportion of companies with active HIV/AIDS working groups,
with HIV/AIDS counselors, and companies allowing employees to file reimbursement claims for
STD treatment from the company’s health budget (Table 14).

Table 14 Companies with supplementary HIV/AIDS activities
Round 1
n = 125
%

Round 2
n = 117
%

Significance
(Pearson chi2)

Active HIV/AIDS working group

18

31

.016*

Have HIV/AIDS volunteer

20

21

.793

Have HIV/AIDS counselor

43

74

< .001**

Allow employees to claim STI treatment

16

42

< .001**

Social contribution
Researchers initially aimed to represent company expenditure on community HIV/AIDS activities
in relation to annual income, but were unable to acquire complete records of company incomes
from either the Stock Exchange of Thailand or the Ministry of Industry. Instead, companies were
awarded a dichotomous score of either five or zero to reflect whether or not they were making any
kind of contributions (cash or in-kind) to the wider community on HIV/AIDS issues.

36

Workplace AIDS Program in Thailand

Mean scores in this area increased from 1.7 in round 1 to 2.5 in round 2, out of a maximum of 5
points (Table 8), as the proportion of companies claiming to be involved in HIV/AIDS community
activities increased from 36 to 50 percent (Table 15). Meanwhile, simultaneous declines were
observed among companies donating money for HIV/AIDS community activities and among
companies providing expenses for education or new businesses to family members of HIV-positive
employees. Significant improvements were observed for “other” community activities, including
donating company products to HIV/AIDS organizations.

Table 15 Percent of companies involved in community activities related to
HIV/AIDS
Round 1
%

Round 2
%

n = 125

n = 125

36

50

n = 45

n = 58

Donated money to PLHA
Donated money for HIV/AIDS community activities
Organized fund-raising events for PLHA

34
21
9

35
7
8

.903
.042*
.934

Assisted in educational expenses and helped
establish new businesses for family members
of HIV-positive employees

18

7

.086

Other contributions

12

50

< .001**

Was your company involved in HIV/AIDS
community activities?

Significance
(Pearson
chi2)

.033*

Differences between AIA and non-AIA client companies
Table 16 shows that at baseline, there were no significant differences between the accreditation
scores of companies that were clients of AIA and companies with life insurance policies from other
providers (mean scores 39.9 and 35.1, respectively). By round two, the scores of AIA client
companies, which had earned a reduction on their life insurance, had improved significantly more
than non-clients, who stood to gain no such financial reward (scores of 63.6 and 46.5). Further,
AIA client companies spent more money on changing their HIV/AIDS programs and policies than
non-AIA clients (see the section on cost-benefit analysis below). These findings suggest that
linking the accreditation scheme to reduced insurance premiums provided AIA member companies
with a greater incentive to make improvements in workplace HIV/AIDS programs than
nonmember companies. As observed above, the financial incentive had not been sufficient to
recruit companies to join the program, but companies that were able to gain a financial reward
made greater efforts and showed greater improvements once they had already joined.
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Table 16 Company accreditation scores for AIA members and nonmembers
Round 1
AIA
n = 42
%

Non-AIA
n = 83
%

Round 2
Significance

AIA
n = 31
%

Non-AIA
n = 86
%

7

16

49

16

62

24

15

77

22

39.93

35.12

63.61

46.47

Low score
0-29

41

36

Medium score
30-59

36

High score
60 -positive
Mean

.260
(Pearson
chi2)

.201
(t-test)

Significance

< .001**
(Pearson
chi2)

< .001**
(t-test)

Employees
Respondent profile
Table 17 shows the characteristics of the employees surveyed in the two survey rounds. In round 1,
9,603 employees completed the SAQ, while in round 2, with fewer participating companies, 7,850
employees did so. Although three quarters of the questionnaire respondents filled in the survey for
only one of the rounds, there were no significant differences between the respondents’
sociodemographic characteristics at each round. There were no significant differences overall in the
mean duration of employment (67.07 months in round 1 and 67.7 months in round 2, p = .523
independent sample t-test).
This section analyzes the impact of improved HIV/AIDS workplace policies and program activities
on employees, comparing the 94 companies who improved on their accreditation scores to the 20
companies that received a lower score in the second round. Employees from the three companies
that did not change their accreditation score over two rounds are not included.
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Table 17 Characteristics of employees
Round 1
%

Round 2
%

n = 9,603

n = 7,850

Male

51

50

Female

49

50

27 and under

35

36

28-34

34

33

35 and over

32

31

Primary

15

14

High school

41

41

Vocational

22

22

University

22

23

Single

41

42

Married

54

53

Divorced

3

3

Widowed

2

2

n = 5,966

n = 2,942

Yes

68

69

No

32

31

Significance
(Pearson chi2)

Sex
.112

Age
.225

Education
.078

Marital status

If you are married or have been
married, do you have children?

39

.175

.324

Knowledge
Researchers examining employees’ knowledge about HIV and risk behaviors detected some small
improvements among employees of companies whose scores improved, yet the magnitude of these
changes did not exceed a few percentage points (Table 18). Some selected results of questions that
covered a wide range of issues regarding employees’ knowledge of HIV/AIDS are shown below.

Table 18 Employees’ knowledge about HIV/AIDS, by company accreditation score
change
Do you think that … ?
(% answered yes)

Companies with
improved score

Companies with
worse score

Significance
(Pearson
chi2)

%

n

%

n

Round 1

71

7,216

71

984

.802

Round 2

75

6,393

71

909

.008**

Round 1

64

7,176

68

983

.017*

Round 2

67

6,358

60

904

< .001**

Round 1

73

7,152

67

990

< .001**

Round 2

76

6,338

70

890

< .001**

Round 1

6

7,193

5

980

.393

Round 2

5

6,361

7

900

.043 *

… the AIDS virus can penetrate
through wounds and organ tissues

… the female anatomy places
females at greater risk than males

…living with a PLHA poses no or
low risk

…having multiple sexual partners
poses no or low risk

Attitudes
Tables 19 and 20 and Figure 8 indicate that researchers detected some significant differences in
stigmatizing attitudes between employees of companies with improved and deteriorated
accreditation scores. However, due to the enormously large sample size, the actual extent of these
changes was extremely small and may not have programmatic significance.

40

Workplace AIDS Program in Thailand

Table 19 Employees’ attitudes toward PLHA, by company accreditation score
change
Percentage of employees who
believe that…
… they can work in the same room
as PLHA
Round 1

Companies with
improved score
%
n

Companies with
worse score
%
n

Significance
2
(Pearson chi )

83

7,229

84

989

.176

83

6,424

83

904

.923

62

7,202

65

988

.058

66

6,411

67

903

.383

65

7,192

65

988

.792

67

6,409

63

903

.009 **

55

7,175

54

988

.352

57

6,409

50

897

< .001 **

64

7,168

59

982

.001 **

64

6,386

58

898

< .001 **

67

7,219

73

981

.001**

72

6,388

70

904

.005**

73

7,217

77

985

.017*

75

6,390

72

904

.032*

24

7,199

32

977

< .001*

29

6,377

27

900

.113

…companies should support employees
to have voluntary blood tests
Round 1
74

Round 2
… they can use the same toilet as
PLHA
Round 1
Round 2
… they can eat with PLHA
Round 1
Round 2
… they can take care of PLHA
Round 1
Round 2
… they can touch PLHA
Round 1
Round 2
…their company should not announce
which employees are HIV-positive
Round 1
Round 2
…HIV-positive employees should
not be sacked
Round 1
Round 2
…employees should not be
forced to have a blood test
Round 1
Round 2

Round 2
…HIV-positive employees should
receive the same conditions as
other workers
Round 1
Round 2

7,192

73

982

.691

74

6,367

72

901

.447

81

7,201

81

984

.978

82

6,383

81

900

.863
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Figure 8 Employee attitudes toward PLHA
100

care: company
improved score

Percentage

80

care: company worse
score

60

touch: company
improved score

40

touch: company
worse score

20

0
Round 1

Round 2

Behavior
Researchers found little evidence of behavior change reported by employees over the course of the
study, and few differences in employees’ behavior between companies whose scores improved and
deteriorated (Table 20). The only statistically significant reported change was in the percentage of
employees having conversations about HIV/AIDS in the last year, but this too was of very minor
actual impact.
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Table 20 Employees’ reported risk behavior, by companies’ accreditation score
change
Companies with
improved score
%
n

Companies with
worse score
%
n

Significance
(Pearson
chi2)

Male employees who had sex with
a sex worker (SW) in the last year
Round 1

25

3,109

27

539

.322

Round 2

24

2,713

28

483

.079

Round 1

72

740

74

141

.605

Round 2

76

633

73

132

.476

Round 1

31

5,508

31

801

.579

Round 2

40

4,973

43

713

.051

Round 1

42

775

43

111

.774

Round 2

28

1,905

28

300

.805

Round 1

82

7,319

81

994

.376

Round 2

83

6,506

79

928

.007 **

Male employees who always used
a condom when visiting a SW in
the last year

Employees who had sex with someone who was not his/her husband/
wife nor a SW in the last year

Employees who always used a
condom when having sex with a
person who was not their
husband/wife or SW

Employees who had conversations
with friends about HIV/AIDS in the
last year
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Cost-benefit Analysis
Precise estimation of the costs and benefits of participation in ASO is an extremely difficult task,
requiring calibration of nonmonetary costs. The approximation that follows below is based on data
collected from company managers in both survey rounds.

Companies
The costs associated with company participation in ASO were determined based on estimates of
the direct and indirect costs of:
• Managers’ responsibilities in making the decision to join ASO, developing company
HIV/AIDS policies, and being interviewed for the company surveys.
• Employees who completed the SAQ, attended HIV/AIDS training sessions, received
HIV/AIDS information, and/or received counseling during working hours.
• Specially designated staff responsible for organizing HIV/AIDS training, disseminating
information, distributing and/or selling condoms, counseling, and visiting PLHA..
Table 21 below suggests that AIA client companies appeared to spend more money on changing
their HIV/AIDS programs and policies than non-AIA clients. The high variability of these
estimates may be due to the fact that a small number of companies carried out HIV/AIDS training
for most of their workforces, incurring disproportionately high costs. Furthermore, few companies
were able to provide researchers with cost information to this degree of detail.

Table 21 Estimated cost and benefits of the ASO project
Costs per company
Mean

Non-AIA
clients

AIA
clients

Costs per employee

Median

Mean

Median

Round 1
n = 83

Round 2
n = 86

Round 1
n = 83

Round 2
n = 86

Round 1
n = 83

Round 2
n = 86

Round 1
n = 83

Round 2
n = 86

13,907

18,600

3,104

3,700

22

33

10.3

9.3

Round 1
n = 42

Round 2
n = 31

Round 1
n = 42

Round 2
n = 31

Round 1
n = 42

Round 2
n = 31

Round 1
n = 42

Round 2
n = 31

43,870

274,686

10,000

13,500

141

569

20.7

31.9

Note: All costs are in baht; 42 baht is equivalent to $1.

This study is unable to capture the comparative costs of taking no measures against HIV/AIDS,
including the nonmonetary costs associated with declining morale and the monetary costs
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associated with absenteeism, lost productivity, and increased staff turnover (hiring and training).
These costs will increase as HIV prevalence increases and more employees are affected and
infected by HIV/AIDS. Furthermore, the nonmonetary benefits of improved staff morale and
company public image from participation in ASO have not been included in the analysis.
To be honest, what I think is the case is that those companies that joined the project are
concerned about their public image. It shows that they care for their employees.
Manager, large nonparticipating company

Insurance provider
AIA, the life insurance policy provider, estimated that it spent 3,251,874 baht on the ASO project,
including expenditures on personnel and operations administration costs, funding a public relations
program, producing printed materials, and covering reductions on the group life insurance rates.
AIA gained limited short-term and/or financial benefits from participation in the ASO project.
ASO was not used as a marketing promotion to recruit new clients for group life insurance.
However, in the long term, AIA gained the benefit of national and international recognition for its
involvement in an effective HIV/AIDS prevention and nondiscrimination program, funded through
its own Community Fund. Public recognition for AIA to date has included commendations from
the Thai Ministries of Public Health and Labour and Social Welfare, high-profile presentations at
national and international conferences, and the inclusion of the ASO project on the international
“best practice” list of the Global Business Council on AIDS. The World Economic Forum has also
shown interest in the project.
In the long term, another possible benefit for AIA would be the achievement of a reduction in
HIV/AIDS in Thailand, which was stated as one of the project’s main goals. Apart from the wider
societal value of this worthy goal, reducing HIV/AIDS in Thailand would enable AIA to gain the
additional benefit of reduced medical and life insurance claims by policyholders. Even if the
project is successful, such a benefit would not be seen for many years, given the time from the
onset of the disease to emergence of health problems.

45

Lessons Learned

Managers were more motivated to get involved in the initiative by a feeling of social
responsibility to improve their policies and programs than by the program incentives.
The study revealed the encouraging finding that the most popular reason for joining the program
cited by managers was an altruistic sense of responsibility to act in the best interests of their
employees. Nearly 60 percent of the 125 participating company managers choosing to join ASO
reported that they decided to participate out of a sense of responsibility to their workers and the
wider community to do something about HIV/AIDS. Managers indicated that they felt that joining
the program was “the right thing to do,” both for their employees and for the community in which
they live and work. The ASO program provided a timely and effective vehicle for the expression of
this belief. Other motivations reported by managers to join the initiative were that ASO would
allow them to find out how their HIV/AIDS policies and programs compare to those of other
companies and to better understand the disease and how employees may be at risk due to their
behavior.
The financial and public recognition incentives were not found to be popular motivating factors for
participation in the scheme. Few managers reported that they were motivated to join ASO because
of the possibility of achieving a cost reduction in their group life insurance premiums. Only 11
percent of managers who participated said that they had joined ASO for its financial benefits, while
the rest—particularly smaller companies with fewer resources—did not perceive the premium
reduction as being sufficient to justify the additional costs of introducing the policies and activities.
With life insurance coverage costing employers an average premium of 250 baht (US $5.85) per
employee, the maximum reduction available was 25 baht (US $0.59) per employee.
The certificate introduced during the project also did not provide sufficient motivation to encourage
company managers to join the ASO scheme. In spite of the high-profile award ceremony, some
company managers felt that the program was not widely recognized. Researchers discovered that
an additional incentive to recruitment would be the achievement of high-level patronage, from
international organizations (e.g., ILO, UNAIDS) or the Thai royal family, in order to distinguish
the ASO certificate from other competing certificates. Another possible strategy would be to
increase public and professional awareness of the project and advocate for company participation,
so that achievement of the certificate would become a more widely recognized goal.

Managers with close or preexisting connections to the initiative (physical location, staff
contacts, company commitment to HIV) were more likely to participate.
Overall participation in the initiative was 15 percent of the 857 companies originally invited.
Participating companies included factories, hotels, and commercial and professional firms, and
companies of diverse size and ownership characteristics. Company characteristics associated with
higher levels of participation in the initiative included a history of previous involvement in
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HIV/AIDS activities and the manager’s personal commitment to the issue. The most successful
contact method of recruiting companies was approaching personal contacts. Locally owned and
headquartered companies had significantly higher participation levels than those in which the locus
of decision making was physically more distant. Companies with higher numbers of employees
insured by AIA, to whom the fixed costs of the required policy changes represented a
proportionately smaller burden, were more likely to sign up to the initiative.

Most participating companies improved their HIV/AIDS policies and programs.
Among those companies that participated in the initiative, researchers found marked improvements
in HIV/AIDS policies and programs that indicated the creation of a more favorable workplace
environment. Between the two survey rounds, the mean total accreditation score to evaluate
HIV/AIDS policies and programs increased from 37 to 51 points out of a maximum of 100 (p <
.001). Accreditation scores improved at 82 percent of participating companies.

Among participating companies, financial incentives were associated with greater policy
improvements.
The evidence above suggested that financial incentives alone provided insufficient motivation for
company recruitment to the initiative. However, once recruited, those companies eligible for the
financial incentive showed greater improvements in their HIV/AIDS activities than other
companies that did not stand to gain any financial reward from policy implementation.
About a third of 125 companies that joined ASO (34 percent) held AIA group life insurance
policies and were eligible for premium reductions. These AIA member companies showed greater
improvements in their policies and spent more to improve their programs than did non-AIA
member companies that joined ASO and were ineligible for financial benefits.
Although the financial incentive was perceived to be insufficient to motivate many companies to
join ASO, it likely played a positive role once companies had already signed up. AIA member
companies showed greater improvements in their policies and spent more to improve their
programs than did the non-AIA member companies that joined ASO and were thus ineligible for
financial benefits. Financial rewards can clearly have an impact on company polices and programs,
but their influence in this study was limited to policy implementation and not company recruitment.
Further research is needed to determine the threshold level of financial incentive which, combined
with efforts to tap into managers’ willingness to respond to the epidemic, will be a sufficient
motivator to effect improvements in workplace environments. The question remains as to whether
it is either realistic or socially desirable to expect insurance companies to provide larger incentives
to their members and assume the burden of corporate social responsibility.
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Broad policy improvements were not associated with changes at the employee level.
The self-administered employee surveys indicated very limited impact of workplace improvements
on the knowledge and behavior of individuals, even those employed by companies whose
workplace policies improved. This is not surprising, since the basic policy changes required by
ASO were subtle and unlikely to effect major or immediate change directly on employees. The
focus of ASO was on nondiscriminatory policies, which help to safeguard workers’ rights but
likely do little to directly foster sexual risk-reduction behaviors. The long-term changes at which
these policy improvements were aimed cannot be captured by short-term employee surveys.
Furthermore, while TBCA offered companies a menu of materials and services to improve
workplace HIV/AIDS programs, the inputs requested may not have been sufficiently intense to
result in improvements robust enough to make a difference in workers’ knowledge and behaviors.
Therefore, in future endeavors, more attention needs to be paid not only to participation but to the
program content of HIV/AIDS workplace activities.

The recruitment process and data collection methods can be improved by streamlining.
The study revealed additional unforeseen weaknesses in the recruitment process. Future scale-up
must recognize the finding that some company managers incorrectly perceived the ASO scheme to
be an AIA marketing policy. The nonpartisan nature of the scheme must be clarified from the
outset, perhaps by endorsement from the Thai Insurance Association (an umbrella organization
representing all insurance companies in Thailand) or a wider collective of private industry or
government agencies. Sponsorship from a government agency or industry-wide body would also
have greater potential for investment in public relations materials and reaching more companies
than was possible by an NGO with limited financial resources.
As the program is scaled up, continuing research should determine whether an NGO with expertise
in HIV/AIDS, a private enterprise, or a government department would be more successful in
recruiting private enterprises to undertake HIV/AIDS workplace activities. Would direct
involvement from government departments, which could force private enterprises to undertake
such activities, result in companies introducing token or substantive HIV/AIDS programs?
Recruitment procedures need to be better planned and executed, to avoid discouraging managers
who declined to join because the sign-up process appeared overly complicated. Company databases
must be checked and updated before any contact is made to ensure that senior management and
human resource directors are correctly and directly approached. Clear policy directions regarding
the language (Thai, English or both), timeframe (sufficient time before planned project
implementation), and mode of contact (fax, telephone, face-to-face) are required.
The study invested significant resources in collecting data from employees and company managers,
because it was unclear how reliable managers’ responses alone would be when they stood to gain a
financial incentive by claiming that they had introduced new HIV/AIDS policies and programs.
Administering the SAQ to large numbers of employees was time-consuming, administratively
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complicated, and expensive in terms of the opportunity cost of alternate activities for employees
and employers. Further analysis is required to determine the degree of consistency between
manager and employee responses and the extent to which the resource-intensive employee data
could be replaced by data collected from managers. Relying on information about company
programs and policies collected from managers alone could substantially reduce the costs of data
collection, and simplify the complicated logistics that previously served as a disincentive to
company participation.
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Next Steps
Building on the findings of this study, a modified version of the initiative will be scaled up to 25
provinces in Thailand, beginning in late 2003. TBCA has received funding from the Global Fund to
recruit 2,500 workplaces to participate in the new program, in cooperation with the Ministry of
Public Health, the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, business groups, AIA, and local
nongovernmental organizations.
Each participating workplace will have to implement four key policies, including the three key
policies from the original initiative and the additional policy of explicitly providing HIV/AIDS
education to their staff. Managers of participating workplaces will be trained in how to deal with
HIV/AIDS in the workplace, and staff members will be trained to be HIV/AIDS trainers for their
workplace. The increasing emphasis on these activities will necessitate additional attention to
monitoring and quality control and new, longer-term criteria to evaluate their impact.
TBCA has sought and gained further official backing from the Thai Government. The fact that the
program will be accredited and endorsed by the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of
Labour and Social Welfare will be publicized heavily, to improve its public image and enhance its
importance and prestige. Invitation letters will be sent on official paper, and managers will become
aware early in the recruitment process that senior representatives of the Ministry of Public Health
and the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare will sign the certificates of achievement.
AIA will continue to support the scheme through life insurance premiums, but member reductions
will only be available at two discrete levels (5 percent and 10 percent), rather than the graduated
levels as previously, to reduce administrative requirements. One major change to the scheme will
be a new focus on the specific support needs of small and medium-sized enterprises, including very
small, informal workplaces.
TBCA has also been working with the International Labour Organisation and the Department of
Labour Protection and Welfare in Rayong province to further develop ASO for wider applications
and ensure its compliance with internationally recognized guidelines, such as the ILO Code of
Practice on HIV/AIDS and the World of Work (e.g., revision of the scores for each element of an
HIV/AIDS workplace policy).
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